I. The Institution of Government.
Conditions on which the public power can act. - Two points forgotten by the authors of the preceding constitutions. - Difficulty of the undertaking and poor quality of the available materials.
Every human society requires government， that is to say an authority.
No other machinery is more useful. But a machinery is useful only if it is adapted to its purpose； if not it will not work， or may even work contrary to its purpose. Hence， during its construction， one must first of all consider the magnitude of the work it has to do as well as the quality of the materials one has at one's disposal. It is very important to know beforehand whether it will lift 100 or of 100，000kilograms， whether the pieces fitted together will be of iron or of steel， of sound or of unsound timber. - But the legislators had not taken that into consideration during the last ten years. They had set themselves up as theoreticians， and likewise as optimists， without looking at the things， or else imagining the them as they wished to have them. In the national assemblies， as well as with the public， the task was deemed easy and ******， whereas it was extraordinary and immense； for the matter in hand consisted in effecting a social revolution and in carrying on an European war. The materials were supposed to be excellent， as manageable as they were substantial， while， in fact， they were very poor， being both refractory and brittle， for these human materials consisted of the Frenchmen of 1789and of the following years； that is to say， of exceedingly sensitive men doing each other all possible harm， inexperienced in political business， Utopians， impatient， intractable， and overexcited.
Calculations had been made on these prodigiously false data；consequently， although the calculations were very exact， the results obtained were found absurd. Relying on these data， the machine had been planned， and all its parts been adjusted， assembled， and balanced. That is why the machine， irreproachable in theory， remained unsuccessful in practice： the better it appeared on paper the quicker it broke down when set up on the ground.
II. Default of previous government.
The consequences of the years 1789 to 1799. - Insubordination of the local powers， conflict of the central powers， suppression of liberal institutions， and the establishment of an unstable despotism. - Evil-doing of the government thus formed.
A capital defect at once declared itself in the two principal compositions， in the working gear of the superposed powers and in the balance of the motor powers. - In the first place， the hold given to the central government on its local subordinates was evidently too feeble； with no right to appoint these， it could not select them as it pleased， according to the requirements of the service. Department， district， canton， and commune administrators， civil and criminal judges， assessors， appraisers， and collectors of taxes， officers of the national-guard and even of the gendarmerie， police-commissioners， and other agents who had to enforce laws on the spot， were nearly all recruited elsewhere： either in popular assemblies or provided ready-made by elected bodies.[1] They were for it merely borrowed instruments； thus originating， they escaped its control； it could not make them work as it wanted them to work. On most occasions they would shirk their duties； at other times， on receiving orders， they would stand inert； or， again， they would act outside of or beyond their special function， either going too far or acting in a contrary sense；never did they act with moderation and precision， with coherence and consequence. For this reason any desire of the government to do its job proved unsuccessful. Its legal subordinates - incapable， timid， lukewarm， unmanageable， or even hostile - obeyed badly， did not obey at all， or willfully disobeyed. The blade of the executive instrument， loose in the handle， glanced or broke off when the thrust had to be made.
In the second place， never could the two or three motor forces thrusting the handle act in harmony， owing to the clashing of so many of them； one always ended in breaking down the other. The Constituent Assembly had set aside the King， the Legislative Assembly had deposed him， the Convention had decapitated him. Afterward each fraction of the sovereign body in the Convention had proscribed the other； the Montagnards had guillotined the Girondists， and the Thermidorians had guillotined the Montagnards. Later， under the Constitution of the year III， the Fructidorians had banished the Constitutionalists， the Directory had purged the Councils， and the Councils had purged the Directory. - Not only did the democratic and parliamentary institution fail in its work and break down on trial， but， again， through its own action， it became transformed into its opposite. In a year or two a coup d'état in Paris took place； a faction seized the central power and converted it into an absolute power in the hands of five or six ringleaders. The new government at once re-forged the executive instrument for its own advantage and refastened the blade firmly on the handle； in the provinces it dismissed those elected by the people and deprived the governed of the right to choose their own rulers；henceforth， through its proconsuls on mission， or through its resident commissioners， it alone appointed， superintended， and regulated on the spot all local authorities.[2]