1.Mathematical judgements are always synthetical.Hitherto this fact, though incontestably true and very important in its consequences, seems to have escaped the analysts of the human mind, nay, to be in complete opposition to all their conjectures.For as it was found that mathematical conclusions all proceed according to the principle of contradiction (which the nature of every apodeictic certainty requires), people became persuaded that the fundamental principles of the science also were recognized and admitted in the same way.But the notion is fallacious; for although a synthetical proposition can certainly be discerned by means of the principle of contradiction, this is possible only when another synthetical proposition precedes, from which the latter is deduced, but never of itself which Before all, be it observed, that proper mathematical propositions are always judgements a priori, and not empirical, because they carry along with them the conception of necessity, which cannot be given by experience.If this be demurred to, it matters not; I will then limit my assertion to pure mathematics, the very conception of which implies that it consists of knowledge altogether non-empirical and a priori.
We might, indeed at first suppose that the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is a merely analytical proposition, following (according to the principle of contradiction) from the conception of a sum of seven and five.
But if we regard it more narrowly, we find that our conception of the sum of seven and five contains nothing more than the uniting of both sums into one, whereby it cannot at all be cogitated what this single number is which embraces both.The conception of twelve is by no means obtained by merely cogitating the union of seven and five;and we may analyse our conception of such a possible sum as long as we will, still we shall never discover in it the notion of twelve.We must go beyond these conceptions, and have recourse to an intuition which corresponds to one of the two- our five fingers, for example, or like Segner in his Arithmetic five points, and so by degrees, add the units contained in the five given in the intuition, to the conception of seven.For I first take the number 7, and, for the conception of 5 calling in the aid of the fingers of my hand as objects of intuition, I add the units, which I before took together to make up the number 5, gradually now by means of the material image my hand, to the number 7, and by this process, I at length see the number 12 arise.That 7 should be added to 5, I have certainly cogitated in my conception of a sum = 7 + 5, but not that this sum was equal to 12.Arithmetical propositions are therefore always synthetical, of which we may become more clearly convinced by trying large numbers.For it will thus become quite evident that, turn and twist our conceptions as we may, it is impossible, without having recourse to intuition, to arrive at the sum total or product by means of the mere analysis of our conceptions.just as little is any principle of pure geometry analytical."A straight line between two points is the shortest," is a synthetical proposition.For my conception of straight contains no notion of quantity, but is merely qualitative.The conception of the shortest is therefore fore wholly an addition, and by no analysis can it be extracted from our conception of a straight line.Intuition must therefore here lend its aid, by means of which, and thus only, our synthesis is possible.
Some few principles preposited by geometricians are, indeed, really analytical, and depend on the principle of contradiction.
They serve, however, like identical propositions, as links in the chain of method, not as principles- for example, a = a, the whole is equal to itself, or (a+b) > a, the whole is greater than its part.And yet even these principles themselves, though they derive their validity from pure conceptions, are only admitted in mathematics because they can be presented in intuition.What causes us here commonly to believe that the predicate of such apodeictic judgements is already contained in our conception, and that the judgement is therefore analytical, is merely the equivocal nature of the expression.We must join in thought a certain predicate to a given conception, and this necessity cleaves already to the conception.
But the question is, not what we must join in thought to the given conception, but what we really think therein, though only obscurely, and then it becomes manifest that the predicate pertains to these conceptions, necessarily indeed, yet not as thought in the conception itself, but by virtue of an intuition, which must be added to the conception.
2.The science of natural philosophy (physics) contains in itself synthetical judgements a priori, as principles.I shall adduce two propositions.For instance, the proposition, "In all changes of the material world, the quantity of matter remains unchanged"; or, that, "In all communication of motion, action and reaction must always be equal." In both of these, not only is the necessity, and therefore their origin a priori clear, but also that they are synthetical propositions.For in the conception of matter, I do not cogitate its permanency, but merely its presence in space, which it fills.Itherefore really go out of and beyond the conception of matter, in order to think on to it something a priori, which I did not think in it.The proposition is therefore not analytical, but synthetical, and nevertheless conceived a priori; and so it is with regard to the other propositions of the pure part of natural philosophy.