Now, what is the cause of this difference in the fortune of the philosopher and the mathematician, the former of whom follows the path of conceptions, while the latter pursues that of intuitions, which he represents, a priori, in correspondence with his conceptions? The cause is evident from what has been already demonstrated in the introduction to this Critique.We do not, in the present case, want to discover analytical propositions, which may be produced merely by analysing our conceptions- for in this the philosopher would have the advantage over his rival; we aim at the discovery of synthetical propositions- such synthetical propositions, moreover, as can be cognized a priori.I must not confine myself to that which Iactually cogitate in my conception of a ********, for this is nothing more than the mere definition; I must try to go beyond that, and to arrive at properties which are not contained in, although they belong to, the conception.Now, this is impossible, unless Idetermine the object present to my mind according to the conditions, either of empirical, or of pure, intuition.In the former case, Ishould have an empirical proposition (arrived at by actual measurement of the angles of the ********), which would possess neither universality nor necessity; but that would be of no value.In the latter, I proceed by geometrical construction, by means of which Icollect, in a pure intuition, just as I would in an empirical intuition, all the various properties which belong to the schema of a ******** in general, and consequently to its conception, and thus construct synthetical propositions which possess the attribute of universality.
It would be vain to philosophize upon the ********, that is, to reflect on it discursively; I should get no further than the definition with which I had been obliged to set out.There are certainly transcendental synthetical propositions which are framed by means of pure conceptions, and which form the peculiar distinction of philosophy; but these do not relate to any particular thing, but to a thing in general, and enounce the conditions under which the perception of it may become a part of possible experience.
But the science of mathematics has nothing to do with such questions, nor with the question of existence in any fashion; it is concerned merely with the properties of objects in themselves, only in so far as these are connected with the conception of the objects.
In the above example, we merely attempted to show the great difference which exists between the discursive employment of reason in the sphere of conceptions, and its intuitive exercise by means of the construction of conceptions.The question naturally arises: What is the cause which necessitates this twofold exercise of reason, and how are we to discover whether it is the philosophical or the mathematical method which reason is pursuing in an argument?
All our knowledge relates, finally, to possible intuitions, for it is these alone that present objects to the mind.An a priori or non-empirical conception contains either a pure intuition- and in this case it can be constructed; or it contains nothing but the synthesis of possible intuitions, which are not given a priori.In this latter case, it may help us to form synthetical a priori judgements, but only in the discursive method, by conceptions, not in the intuitive, by means of the construction of conceptions.
The only a priori intuition is that of the pure form of phenomena-space and time.A conception of space and time as quanta may be presented a priori in intuition, that is, constructed, either alone with their quality (figure), or as pure quantity (the mere synthesis of the homogeneous), by means of number.But the matter of phenomena, by which things are given in space and time, can be presented only in perception, a posteriori.The only conception which represents a priori this empirical content of phenomena is the conception of a thing in general; and the a priori synthetical cognition of this conception can give us nothing more than the rule for the synthesis of that which may be contained in the corresponding a posteriori perception; it is utterly inadequate to present an a priori intuition of the real object, which must necessarily be empirical.
Synthetical propositions, which relate to things in general, an a priori intuition of which is impossible, are transcendental.For this reason transcendental propositions cannot be framed by means of the construction of conceptions; they are a priori, and based entirely on conceptions themselves.They contain merely the rule, by which we are to seek in the world of perception or experience the synthetical unity of that which cannot be intuited a priori.But they are incompetent to present any of the conceptions which appear in them in an a priori intuition; these can be given only a posteriori, in experience, which, however, is itself possible only through these synthetical principles.